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Ethics, rationing and the COVID-19 pandemic:
philosophy and practice: Does philosophy 
have a role in practical debate – 
about COVID, or anything else?
Michael Loughlin
Ever since Socrates  rst shuf ed into the Athenian marketplace,
philosophers have acquired a reputation for asking annoying questions.
Their persistent quest for clarity entails repeatedly insisting that others
spell out what they mean by the terms they use and how they justify the
inferences they make, questioning assumptions their unfortunate
interlocutors thought too obvious to require articulation. This relentless
search for clarity seems somewhat paradoxical to some, when the
typical effect on the interlocutors is to shift them from certainty to
uncertainty – what is revealed by the dialogue is rarely a straightforward
proof of any given claim, nor a vindication of any particular de nition.
Rather, it is an awareness that what seemed beyond doubt may indeed
be reasonably questioned, that beliefs which apparently stood on solid
ground lack clear foundations, and de nitions we thought
straightforward are either ambiguous or circular.
Perhaps more worryingly in our current context, the de facto role of
the philosopher can be to undermine our con dence in expertise.
Again, consider Socrates. In a typical dialogue, he confronts someone
who thinks himself an expert – be it on the nature of knowledge,
justice, piety or courage – and in no time at all exposes the insecurity of
this person’s grasp on the concepts he wields and the questionable
nature of the pronouncements he makes. The effect on the audience
might well be to establish their own critical faculties as just about the
only thing they feel they can really trust. At a time when politicians
assure us that the public have “had enough of experts”[1] and
concerned parents declare that the best way to protect their children’s
health is not to consult a quali ed health professional, but rather it is to
do their own research at the “university of Google”,[2, 3] the law of
unintended consequences seems depressingly in evidence. Of course,
no serious philosopher, Socratic or otherwise, would want to replace
trust in medical expertise with investigations at the university of Google,
especially regarding such issues as vaccinating children against
dangerous conditions. Such an outcome was never the intention of any
credible project to promote critical thinking. But in a time of a global
pandemic, mass adherence to safety recommendations is needed to
control the spread of the coronavirus. What is more, any hope of a
medical solution rests not only in the development of a vaccine but in
the willingness of the public to be vaccinated, and the rise of a vocal
“anti-vaxxer” movement is a serious threat to this.
So should we conclude that philosophy has no role in practical
debate, or at least that, when confronted with a problem of such global
proportions as the COVID-19 pandemic, philosophical thinking needs
to be put “on hold”? That is the conclusion of critics of philosophy, who
regard the discipline as something which (at best) can be engaged with
in our spare time, when we are not too busy solving practical or “real
world” problems.[4-8] I have argued elsewhere that such a conclusion
would be premature and ultimately catastrophic, based on the sort of
incomplete and inconsistent reasoning that a proper training in
philosophical methods of argument and analysis dispels.[4, 8] Mill’s
view that a critical population is society’s best defence against
tyranny[9] provides the basis for an education that equips populations
with the skills of systematic, critical evaluation of all claims they are
presented with,[4, 8] including, obviously, the ones they encounter
while touring the university of Google. We need not less, but more
critical thinking, applied with rigour to the tweets of politicians, the
televised diatribes of professional political commentators and to the
blogs and websites of self-identifying “sceptics”, whether their
scepticism concerns vaccines, medical science more generally or
indeed climate science.
Certainly, in these bizarre and horri c times, the need for clear
thinking and intellectual rigour would seem greater than ever. In the
UK, US and elsewhere, a lack of clarity about public health policies is
emerging as a major problem for practical efforts to contain the spread
of the coronavirus. Populations are complaining that they do not
understand what, precisely, they are supposed to do or refrain from
doing, with even leaders admitting that they do not understand the
precise requirements and restrictions on public behaviour they have
put in place.[10, 11] Furthermore, public  gures, including some
public health experts[12, 13] are warning that certain restrictions can
have unthought-through consequences that will actually be counter-
productive with respect to the goal of controlling the virus.
Campaigning groups warn that some restrictions seem to have less to
do with public safety and more to do with building barriers to
legitimate political protest that will outlast the current crisis.[14, 15] All
of this comes against the background of world leaders who routinely
dismiss rational argument and evidence, basing policies on “alternative
facts” and having little time for such philosophical constraints as the
law of non-contradiction – openly contradicting themselves in social
media and TV interviews, giving rise to what some have termed “the
post-truth era”.[16]
In such a context, then, it seems only natural that philosophers
would want to make a contribution to the public debate – but how best
to do so? And how do we overcome the discipline’s perceived lack of
application to all discussions deemed properly practical?
Applied philosophy: two approaches
To give a typically philosophical response, we do need,  rst, to
think about what exactly we mean by a philosophical approach to
practical problems: what, precisely, does it mean to “apply” philosophy?
It seems to me there are two opposing tendencies in applied
philosophy that are particularly pertinent to debates about medicine
and health care, one of which builds on something which can
legitimately be termed the “traditional” philosophical approach and the
other which attempts to amend that approach, with the goal of creating
a distinct, applied version of the discipline. One way of characterising
the distinction here is as follows: is “applied philosophy” simply the
name we give to philosophy when it is done in the context of debates
we feel have particular practical import, or is it a distinct branch of the
subject, with its own methodology?
By the traditional approach, I mean the one already sketched in my
opening comments. Philosophy requires us to question our underlying
assumptions, and to pursue a line of argument to its logical conclusion,
wherever this leads. As the in uential bioethicist Dan Brock argued, in
philosophy “nothing is to be immune from question and criticism…
Whether the results are unpopular or in con ict with conventional or
authoritative views, determining the truth to the best of one’s abilities is
the goal.”[17]
As a consequence, the role of philosophy in applied debates is to
broaden discussion, with the road to clari cation requiring us, at least
at  rst, to look beyond the parameters of debates generated by initial
characterisations of our problems. Were a Socratic dialogue to end with
a summary of established conclusions (on, say, the nature of piety) plus
a  ve-point action plan on how to increase piety throughout Athenian
society, then it would have an outcome that contemporary critics of
philosophy could perhaps deem practical. Instead we end with a sense
that the questions raised are inextricably bound up with other
questions – ones, all too often, that we have yet to answer. The attempt
to focus on speci c claims has led not to a focussed conclusion but a
widening of the discourse – a need to expand or ‘re-map’ the
conceptual boundaries to gain a more accurate understanding of the
nature of the problem.
This, for Brock, represents a serious obstacle to the practice of
applied philosophy. Writing about his experience as Staff Philosopher
on a Presidential Commission, advising policy-makers on a range of
“ethical problems in medicine”, Brock notes that philosophers’
“academic ways” give rise to a natural tendency to “set agendas” that
are, from the perspective of the politicians and managers they hope to
in uence, “unrealistically wide”. To avoid “using up one’s credibility”
and to achieve “signi cant impact”, the philosopher must think and
write with “a more realistic understanding of the constraints of political
reality”.[17] This way of thinking has led to the development of an
approach designed to make philosophy more relevant to ongoing
policy and practice debates, by abandoning the philosophical staple of
widening the debate parameters, of questioning the assumptions and
contexts which give rise to the practical problems needing to be
addressed. Instead, theorists working in biomedical ethics attempt to
apply moral theory to real-world dilemmas to  nd determinate, non-
arbitrary answers to ethical questions facing decision-makers, given the
social and professional structures in which they must work.[18-20]
While they do not deny that legitimate questions can be raised about
these structures, such questions are beyond the remit of the particular
practical project in which they are engaged.[18] As recent contributors
to the debate about ethics and rationing in the context of the COVID
crisis put it: “as an open, democratic society, we owe it to ourselves, to
patients, their families and their doctors, to confront these horri c
questions and to reach speci c answers we can all accept.”[20]
Such horri c questions include how, ethically, to make rationing
decisions in ICU in the context of the pandemic, the creation of
extraordinary legal powers, and issues regarding discrimination and the
de-prioritisation of groups with life-threatening conditions, in order to
prioritise containment of the coronavirus.[19-23] This approach
embodies assumptions regarding proper methodology in applied
philosophy. Speci c moral theories can be dismissed on the grounds
that they fail to supply appropriately “practical” guidance, in the sense
of giving practitioners determinate answers regarding dilemmas
generated by “the broader socio-political and legal structures that
de ne and shape our society”.[19] In reply to the arguments of the
clinician Vegard Wyller that “fair rationing at the bedside is
impossible,”[24] Morten Magelssen and colleagues argue that what they
mean by “bedside rationing” cannot be immoral, because it is
“unavoidable” given the social structures in which health provision
takes place. [18, 25]
Wyller grounds his position in what he calls an “ethics of proximity”
which he argues provides the most intellectually defensible and
intuitively plausible moral framework for a caregiver.[24] While
Magelssen et al. engage to some extent with the speci cs of Wyller’s
philosophical defence of this theory, their grounds for rejecting it seem
to be methodological. Arguing that rationing is unavoidable given the
system as it is, they state that “a well-developed modern professional
ethic ought to be able to incorporate and justify notions of justice and
rationing.” It is precisely because “proximity and care ethics
approaches” are “simply unsuited to provide such an ethical framework
for medicine” that they can be rejected.[18] So Wyller’s position in
moral philosophy leads him to reject their claim that an ethically
defensible method of “bedside rationing” is possible, while the very fact
that his theory implies this conclusion leads Magelssen et al. to dismiss
his theory on methodological grounds.
These differences in philosophical methodology have substantial
implications for practice, with Wyller arguing that, as a practitioner, he
will do the best for the patient in front of him, refusing to take on the
role of “resource stewardship” recommended by the bioethicists with
whom he is engaged in debate.[24] In response, Magelssen and
colleagues conclude he is either ignorant or in denial of the economic
and political realities that frame his practice, with the consequence that
he places subjective, emotional attachment to his patient over
impartial, rational considerations of economic justice.
Advantages, problems and progress
The two approaches are, then, at odds. How do we decide between
them when doing applied philosophy? The proliferation of “applied
ethics” grounded in the second approach has led to a greater
involvement of philosophers in the development of practice guidelines
and ethics committees, and it forms part of a culture that has also led to
the involvement of groups such as health economists in developing
such “decision-making tools” as the quality-adjusted life year (QALY).
[26] Its advantages are apparent, not only to researchers looking for
funding from organisations who make it clear that they want “concrete
answers”, not more questions. As John Coggon and Sadie Regmi point
out,[19] clinicians forced to confront some of the “horri c questions”
they discuss can face the additional worry that their decisions may,
retrospectively, face legal challenges. In such circumstances, it is
reassuring to feel that one can demonstrate that the decision made was
in line with established guidelines. This does not make the decision to
de-prioritise a particular patient, possibly leading to the patient’s
suffering or death, any less distressing or traumatic, but when the
circumstances leave no other option, this at least affords the
practitioner some security.
That said, there are serious dif culties with this approach. We can
hopefully all agree that in circumstances which literally leave no other
option than to sacri ce the life of one human being in order to save
another, it would be extremely unfair to condemn or punish the person
forced to make this horrible decision. That is the case, surely, even if the
decision as to which person to save turns out to be morally arbitrary. As
discussions in applied ethics that long pre-date the current crisis
indicate, if one is in a position of having to decide (for instance) which
unconscious person to pull from the burning building, there need be
no non-arbitrary answer to the question “which one?” – all one knows is
that one ought to save one of them. What is less clear is how one moves
from such extreme cases as this to the broader uses of bioethics and
health economics in vindicating rationing cultures, providing answers
we allegedly should “all accept” to questions about which groups
should be de-prioritised, making it a stipulation of the discourse that
there simply must be a correct answer to these questions.
One of the obvious problems for this form of applied ethics
concerns the contentious nature of the subject. While some bioethicists
claim to possess “ethical expertise”[27] this cannot, surely, mean that
having a quali cation in moral philosophy makes one an expert on
what is right and wrong. The very fact that two philosophers can be just
as well quali ed, yet disagree radically over the answers to important
moral questions, surely con rms this.30 Coggon and Regmi explicitly
accept this point, noting that rationing decisions “may be resolved
through numerous contradictory approaches to prioritisation” and that:
“Multiple values can reasonably be claimed to be justice-based
considerations (that is, to be supported by reasons that an impartial
observer would agree are good reasons) but each gives rise to radically
distinct answers”.[19]
Yet they still endorse the claim (made by Thomas and colleagues,
quoted above) that guidance materials can be produced which give
“speci c answers we can all accept”. This is because they distinguish
“answers we can all accept” from “answers with which we all agree”.
[19] Their use of this distinction suggests a commitment to the sort of
proceduralist position in moral and political philosophy that Wyller
identi ed as at work in the writings of bioethicists: whatever an
individual’s “personal opinion” about what is right and wrong, the
concept of justice in evidence here is grounded in an ideologically
contentious idea that what matters with regard to “justice” is that “the
system in its entirety works, and is seen to work, as a coherent,
authoritative whole”.[19] So, again, the underlying premise of the
whole approach would seem to be that “the broader socio-political and
legal structures that de ne and shape our society” cannot be
challenged. This background assumption de nes the remit of this
debate, and those (such as Wyller) who wish to challenge the justice of
the underlying system are automatically excluded for being
“unrealistic” and “impractical”.[4, 25]
Why do people like Wyller (and I)  nd this constraint on the
discourse so problematic? The answer is related to another question,
regarding how the more traditional philosophical approach can be
meaningfully applied. First of all, we must correct the assumption that
“broadening the debate” is “impractical”: we need to think (again,
reverting to philosophical stereotype) about what we mean by
“practical” – practical for whom? The reasoning that led Brock to his
conclusion on this point was based on his speci c experiences, which
shaped his conception of who is the proper audience for applied
philosophy. While he was one of that rare group of philosophers
“fortunate enough to have the opportunity to use their analytical and
critical skills at in uential points in the policy process”, he
characterises other applied philosophers as “academics just hoping
that an occasional policy-maker might read their scholarly journal
articles.”[17] Now it would, certainly, seem unrealistic for any
philosopher to hope that a Trump, Johnson or Bolsonaro might one day
be browsing – let us say – the Journal of Applied Philosophy, happen
upon an article there,  nd its arguments overwhelmingly convincing
and become inspired to change his whole approach to policy-making
as a consequence.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, many contributors to
philosophical and popular debate might feel that they are writing not
speci cally for the people Brock identi es as “policy-makers” (his
Commissioners and the politicians and senior administrators they
reported to) but rather they might aim to reach “a wider audience,”
meaning “any rational human able to understand the arguments put
forward and willing to take them seriously”.[4] Wyller makes a similar
point in his reply to Magelssen et al., noting that they seem to regard the
political process as “con ned to decisions about general principles of
fair distribution, performed by elected representatives”.[28] For Wyller,
the legitimate political process incorporates “much more than the
formal structures of a representative government; it encompasses a
wide range of public activity” including the organised public protests
and media campaigns his critics dismiss as displays of non-rational
“sentimentality”.[18] As I point out in my response to this exchange,
this broader process also includes the actions and stances of “bolshy”
practitioners like Wyller, who sees his primary obligation as being to the
patient in front of him, not to the politician whose job it is to make the
whole system “tick over” effectively or to the manager whose role it is to
keep a particular budget within a speci ed limit.[25]
These agents may see arguments about broader social justice as
beyond their remit, but Wyller does not. It is central to his conception
of democratic process that the overall system is not “seen to work,” but
that its failings can be identi ed and exposed as the real cause of the
problems facing practitioners and patients. So long as he is being told
that it is not “reasonable” for him to expect the resource-constrained
health service to meet his patient’s needs, he will insist on asking why
the service is so under-funded, drawing attention to the irrational,
wasteful and offensively unequal distribution of resources and
expenditure within the developed national economies of the world and
the global economy. By encouraging his colleagues and patients to ask
similar questions, and to refuse to implement “bedside rationing”
whenever it is possible to do so, he plays a part in a wider discourse
which may succeed in facilitating social progress. History tells us that
large numbers of people failing (or indeed refusing) to work within
“the current realities” represents our best hope of actually changing
those realities.[25] In contrast, a culture in which discussing and
challenging the structural background to constraints on practice is
widely perceived as impractical – as something one might do in one’s
time off work, but which one never brings into the professional context
– is one in which those realities are less likely to change.
So we must, as Coggon and Regmi assert, view our actions within
the context of the socio-political and legal structures of which they are
a part.[19] We must also recognise that such structures are not  xed,
that they develop over time, and that we have the choice to be part of
the social movements and processes that affect the direction of that
development. Horri c events can precipitate change.
When we are confronted with particular tragedies (such as the
 lmed, senseless killing of George Floyd) or global catastrophes such as
the COVID-19 pandemic, we might, of course, react with a sense of
resignation, regarding such “facts of life” as outcomes of social forces
beyond our control – unavoidable, necessary. Alternatively, as reactions
to the Floyd killing reveal, people may react with a sense of outrage,
motivating critical re ection on underlying causes, accompanied by a
desire to expose and eliminate the social dispositions, attitudes and
structures that made the horror “unavoidable”. It is to be hoped that the
current global pandemic precipitates not resignation but a powerful
sense of outrage, a determination on the part of global populations to
ask critical and fundamental questions about how this happened, and
how we may prevent or minimise similar catastrophes in future. With
that goal in mind, representatives of NGOs and campaigning groups
have argued that the developed world cannot, in future, neatly separate
its interests from those who have for so long been so badly
disadvantaged by our current social and economic systems – that far
from “returning to normal”, we need to rethink our relationship with
people in the developing world, with refugees, the homeless and the
dispossessed, as well as considering radical changes in response to
issues regarding the safety and sustainability of food production and
other environmental problems.[30-35] A new sense that our interests
are linked must develop as a basis for recovery from this global
catastrophe.
How can those of us writing in health philosophy contribute to this
positive response to the catastrophe? The simple answer is: by engaging
in the debate. There are those who have argued that we must remap (or
‘unmap’) the conceptual borders between health and social well being,
broadening health discourse to include issues of structural, economic
and environmental injustice.[36, 37] While it is not the role of
philosophers (or, indeed, any other speci c group) to pronounce
de nitively on “the answers”, we can help facilitate progress by being
part of the on-going dialogue which includes patients, practitioners and
indeed anyone with the sense to be interested, including any member
of the public willing to support movements aimed at bringing about
meaningful change.[7, 8]
The worry about the alternative version of “applied philosophy” is
that it insists that, to be practical, the role of theorists must be to  nd
solutions that work given the world as it is. Thus, it risks protecting from
critical scrutiny the very arrangements that need to change if
meaningful progress is to be possible.[4, 25] Indeed, it stipulates that, in
answer to the question “How can we accomplish rationing in a way that
is fair to all parties?” the response: “given the current starting point, no
just solution is possible” is ruled out. Not only is there no reason to
believe this is the case – a moment’s consideration of our position in
human history suggests that it will, at least sometimes and perhaps very
often, be the case. We live in a world of grotesque inequalities, where
“the broader social order” enables “the salary of an individual CEO to
exceed the entire health budget of a developing world nation”[25] and
where something in the region of 29,000 children per day die in the
developing world from poverty-related disease and malnutrition.[38]
Yet on this “practical” approach, those who argue that fundamental
structural change is needed for just solutions to our current problems to
be possible are ruled out a priori.
In contrast to the problem for what I have called the more
traditional approach, the danger is not that the approach might be
misused or misunderstood – rather, this function is built into its
methodology. Despite the undoubtedly laudible intentions of its
exponents, it is sobering to consider the implications of this same
methodology, were it applied at earlier points in human history.
Arrangements we would now regard as quite unquestionably and
utterly indefensible (including slavery) have been defended on the
grounds that their abolition was “unrealistic”, where being unrealistic
means, precisely, calling for something that is simply not viable given
background economic arrangements.[25] We now readily accept that,
if our “starting point” is a slave society and that “background context” is
deemed beyond the scope of realistic, practical discussion, then we
simply cannot arrive at a solution to the problem of how to organise the
production of life’s necessities that is “fair to all concerned”.[4] How,
then, can we assume that our own place in history is so much more
fortunate, that given this particular starting point we can  nd rational
and fair solutions that do not require fundamental social change?
Sometimes, a debate needs at least some members who are prepared to
question “the obvious”, to ask questions others might feel embarrassed
to ask (perhaps for fear of appearing naive or just plain irritating) and
even to conclude that “if the world as it is requires this set of
arrangements, decisions and outcomes, then maybe we need a new
world”. If the philosopher cannot say this, then who can?
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